This is the fourth in a series of posts discussing certain issues and lessons for practitioners arising out of the recently settled dispute between CBS and its controlling stockholder. Relevant background can be found here and additional posts in this series can be found here.
In the first week of the CBS-NAI litigation, the Court of Chancery denied CBS’s request for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), which would have prevented NAI from exercising its rights as a controlling stockholder to protect its voting control before the CBS board could meet and vote on a proposed stock dividend to dilute such voting control. In so ruling, the Court of Chancery resolved an “apparent tension” in the law between, on the one hand, past decisions suggesting the possibility that a board might be justified in diluting a controlling stockholder in extraordinary circumstances (arguably implying that, in such circumstances, the board should be permitted to act without interference by the controlling stockholder) and, on the other hand, cases recognizing the right of a controlling stockholder to have the opportunity to take action to avoid being disenfranchised. The court found the well-established right of a controlling stockholder to take measures to protect its voting control “weigh[ed] heavily” against granting a TRO that would restrain it from doing so, and that “truly extraordinary circumstances” would therefore be required to support such a TRO. At the same time, the court noted that it had the power to review and, if necessary, “set aside” any such action taken by the controlling stockholder after the fact (itself another reason why a TRO in these circumstances was not warranted). Continue Reading Lessons from the CBS-NAI Dispute: When (If Ever) Will the Court of Chancery Grant a TRO To Restrain a Controlling Stockholder From Taking Action to Prevent a Board From Diluting Its Voting Control?