In In re Xura, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, decided earlier this week, the Delaware Court of Chancery denied the target CEO’s motion to dismiss claims that he breached his fiduciary duties by “steer[ing]” the company into an allegedly unfair acquisition by a private equity firm that promised to retain him post-acquisition, while knowing that his job was in jeopardy if the target remained independent. This case is yet another example of why disclosures are so important in the post-Corwin era: Vice Chancellor Slights rejected the CEO’s argument that the claims against him were extinguished by the stockholder vote approving the transaction, finding that a number of material omissions precluded a finding that the stockholders’ vote was fully informed. The vote was thus ineffective to invoke the business judgment rule at the pleading stage. Continue Reading Claim Against Target CEO Survives Dismissal, While Aiding and Abetting Claim Against Private Equity Buyer is Dismissed
The Delaware Court of Chancery recently denied Corwin cleansing in a case involving the sale of a public company while it was engaged in a restatement of its prior audited financial statements. See In re Tangoe, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0650-JRS (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2018). If this sounds familiar, that is because it is the second time in two years that the Court of Chancery has denied a motion to dismiss shareholder litigation on Corwin grounds where the target was in the middle of a restatement process. Together, these decisions suggest that if a board decides to sell the company while under a cloud of an ongoing restatement process, it would need to satisfy a heightened level of scrutiny of its disclosures in order to obtain the benefit of Corwin. The court in Tangoe, however, sought to reassure practitioners that it is not impossible to satisfy Corwin in a case involving an ongoing restatement by the target, and provided a checklist of the kinds of facts that, if disclosed, would result in pleading stage dismissal of a shareholder lawsuit in such a case. Continue Reading <i>Corwin</i> Cleansing Denied For Company Sold During Restatement Process—Sound Familiar?
This is the sixth in a series of posts discussing certain issues and lessons for practitioners arising out of the recently settled dispute between CBS and its controlling stockholder. Relevant background can be found here and additional posts in this series can be found here.
As described in a prior post, on May 14, 2018, certain members of the CBS board filed suit in Delaware seeking authorization to issue a special dividend intended to dilute the voting control of NAI, CBS’s controlling stockholder. The majority of the CBS board (other than three directors with ties to NAI) subsequently considered and purported to approve a dividend of a fraction of a Class A (voting) share to be paid to holders of both CBS’s Class A (voting) common stock and Class B (nonvoting) common stock for the express purpose of diluting NAI’s voting interest in CBS, with the payment of such dividend conditioned on Delaware court approval. Continue Reading Lessons Learned from the CBS-NAI Dispute: Rights of Board Members to Access Privileged Communications with Company Counsel
This is the fifth in a series of posts discussing certain issues and lessons for practitioners arising out of the recently settled dispute between CBS and its controlling stockholder. Relevant background can be found here and additional posts in this series can be found here.
Stock exchange rules and state corporate law often rely on the “independence” of a company’s board of directors as a mechanism for policing potential conflicts of interest that might arise between and among the company’s various constituencies. While stock exchange rules tend to focus on the ongoing independence of directors from management to prevent management from behaving opportunistically at the expense of stockholders, state corporate law also focuses on the independence of directors from a particular stockholder in the context of a transaction with that stockholder and from other directors in the context of derivative actions against such other directors. Continue Reading Lessons From the CBS-NAI Dispute: Who is an “Independent” Director in the Context of a Controlled Company
This memo provides further analysis and expands upon the discussion of the Synutra decision included in our prior post (which can be found here).
In its recent Synutra opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified that take-private transactions will be reviewed under the business judgment rule, so long as the controlling stockholder commits to special committee approval and a majority-of-the-minority vote before “substantive economic negotiations” take place, even if the controlling stockholder fails to self-disable in its initial written offer.
The opinion, written by Chief Justice Strine, explained that the touchstone of the analysis is whether there was any “economic horse trading” before the conditions were put in place.
Please click here to read the full alert memorandum.
The Delaware Court of Chancery yesterday found an activist investor aided and abetted a target board’s breaches of fiduciary duty, most significantly by concealing from the target board (and from the stockholders who were asked to tender into the transaction) material facts bearing on a potential conflict of interest between the activist investor and the target’s remaining stockholders. See In re PLX Technology Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 9880-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018). This decision serves as a reminder of the importance of full disclosure of material facts in cases involving potential conflicts (and not just of the potential conflicts themselves, but also of the ways in which such potential conflicts manifest themselves)—both at the board level and at the stockholder level. As this decision also demonstrates, in addition to the more familiar allegations of financial advisor conflicts, the court may find potential conflicts exist where an activist investor in the target with short-term interests that could be perceived to diverge from the interests of other stockholders is involved in merger negotiations. Continue Reading Delaware Decision Provides Further Lessons for Directors, Activist Investors, and Financial Advisors in Negotiating Mergers
This is the fourth in a series of posts discussing certain issues and lessons for practitioners arising out of the recently settled dispute between CBS and its controlling stockholder. Relevant background can be found here and additional posts in this series can be found here.
In the first week of the CBS-NAI litigation, the Court of Chancery denied CBS’s request for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), which would have prevented NAI from exercising its rights as a controlling stockholder to protect its voting control before the CBS board could meet and vote on a proposed stock dividend to dilute such voting control. In so ruling, the Court of Chancery resolved an “apparent tension” in the law between, on the one hand, past decisions suggesting the possibility that a board might be justified in diluting a controlling stockholder in extraordinary circumstances (arguably implying that, in such circumstances, the board should be permitted to act without interference by the controlling stockholder) and, on the other hand, cases recognizing the right of a controlling stockholder to have the opportunity to take action to avoid being disenfranchised. The court found the well-established right of a controlling stockholder to take measures to protect its voting control “weigh[ed] heavily” against granting a TRO that would restrain it from doing so, and that “truly extraordinary circumstances” would therefore be required to support such a TRO. At the same time, the court noted that it had the power to review and, if necessary, “set aside” any such action taken by the controlling stockholder after the fact (itself another reason why a TRO in these circumstances was not warranted). Continue Reading Lessons from the CBS-NAI Dispute: When (If Ever) Will the Court of Chancery Grant a TRO To Restrain a Controlling Stockholder From Taking Action to Prevent a Board From Diluting Its Voting Control?
Until Vice Chancellor Laster’s decision last week in Akorn Inc. v. Fresenius KABI AG, no Delaware court had released an acquiror from its obligation to close a transaction as a result of the occurrence of a “Material Adverse Effect.” The cases previously adjudicated in Delaware all had required the acquiror to close, often despite a significant diminishment in target value and, in some, the court criticized the acquiror for seeking to avoid its obligations based on little more than buyer’s remorse. Against this weight of precedent, the Vice Chancellor found that the grievous decline of generics pharmaceutical company Akorn, Inc. after it agreed to be acquired by Fresenius constituted a MAC. While Akorn presents a stark set of facts and the Delaware Supreme Court has yet to have the final word in the case, the decision nonetheless provides useful guidance to practitioners in shaping and navigating MAC clauses and related contractual provisions. Continue Reading <i>Akorn v. Fresenius</i>: A MAC in Delaware
This is the third in a series of posts discussing certain issues and lessons for practitioners arising out of the recently settled dispute between CBS and its controlling stockholder.Relevant background can be found here and additional posts in this series can be found here.
As described in a prior post, on May 17, 2018, the majority of the CBS board (other than the three directors with ties to NAI) considered and purported to approve a dividend of a fraction of a Class A (voting) share to be paid to holders of both CBS’s Class A (voting) common stock and Class B (nonvoting) common stock for the express purpose of diluting NAI’s voting interest in CBS, with the payment of such dividend conditioned on Delaware court approval. In addition to diluting NAI’s voting power from about 80% to about 20%, such dividend would have also diluted the voting rights of other Class A stockholders. Continue Reading Lessons From the CBS-NAI Dispute: Can Stockholders Rely on Stock Exchange Rules to Prevent Dilution of Their Voting and Economic Interests?
The Delaware Supreme Court has clarified that controlling stockholder take-private transactions will be reviewed under the business judgment rule, rather than the less deferential entire fairness standard, if the controlling stockholder self-disables by committing to special committee and majority-of-the-minority approval before “economic negotiations” take place, even if the controlling stockholder fails to do so in its initial written offer. See Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., No. 101, 2018 (Del. Oct. 9, 2018).
The Delaware Supreme Court first announced in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (“MFW”) that business judgment review applies to a merger proposed by a controlling stockholder conditioned “ab initio” on two procedural protections: (1) the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee that fulfills its duty of care; and (2) the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders. Continue Reading Delaware Supreme Court Provides Significant Guidance on Timing Requirement Under <i>MFW</i>