ISS and Glass Lewis have arrogated to themselves the power to make law, promulgating a civil code of astounding breadth and detail, ruling over decisions on board composition, director qualifications, term limits, majority voting standards, executive compensation, capital structure, poison pills, staggered boards, the advisability of  mergers, spin-offs and recapitalizations, and, increasingly, ESG policies ranging from animal welfare to climate change, diversity, data security and political activities.  They enforce this civil code by advising their clients, institutional investors with huge, varied and increasingly concentrated holdings across the economy, to vote against proposals or against directors if any aspect of the new civil code is disobeyed.  The vote of these clients is often decisive, and the implications of the votes – especially when considered in the aggregate – have far-reaching consequences for the operation and performance of US public corporations.
Continue Reading The New Civil Code: Obey

The SEC is taking renewed aim at earnings management, and this time it’s not just improper revenue recognition.

Both in its recent enforcement order against Marvell Technology Group – imposing s $5.5 million fine and a cease-and-desist order – and in its on-going action against Under Armour,[1] the SEC has focused on what, anecdotally, is not a terribly uncommon practice – accelerating (or “pulling in”) sales from a future quarter to the present in order to “close the gap between actual and forecasted revenue.”[2]  In both cases, the schemes consisted of offering various incentives, such as “price rebates, discounted prices, free products, and extended payment terms”[3] to entice customers to accept products in the current quarter that they would not need until the next.  In an environment of declining sales, these inorganic efforts to meet earnings numbers allegedly misled the market about the direction of the business.
Continue Reading SEC Cracks Down on Earnings Management

The CEOs of 150 major US public companies recently pledged to act for all of their “stakeholders” – customers, employees, suppliers, communities and yes, even stockholders.[1] Much commentary ensued. But before we get too excited about whether these CEOs are grasping the mantle of government to act on behalf of the citizenry and other people who aren’t paying them, there is the prior question of whether, as a matter of Delaware law, they can.
Continue Reading Outlaws of the Roundtable? Adopting a Long-term Value Bylaw

Institutional investors are howling for US public companies to focus more on the long-term.[1]  This is unsurprising. Long-term focused companies produce significantly better results over time, reporting far greater revenue growth with less volatility, far higher levels of economic profit, and greater total return to shareholders.[2] So if you are holding stock for a long time, a long-term focus for your portfolio companies is critical.
Continue Reading Finding Friends is Hard: Long-Term Investors’ Relationship with Proxy Advisors, Activists and Long-Term Private Equity Funds

If your experiment needs statistics, you ought to have done a better experiment.”  Ernest Rutherford

Sometimes you need to get into the fundamentals to understand if your belief system is sound.  In corporate governance literature of the last two decades, there is no more fundamental concept than Tobin’s Q, which legions of law professors have used as a proxy for firm value.  Based on regression analyses examining variations in Tobin’s Q, they have made definitive pronouncements about any number of corporate governance topics, from staggered boards to the value of activism.  Yet tracing the evolution of Tobin’s Q to its current state—a state completely alien to the original conception—reveals a twisted tale, proceeding like an epidemiological disaster in which Tobin’s Q transforms from an innocent and useful organism in macroeconomics to an unrecognizably mutated and widespread disease in corporate governance literature, infecting policies and practices throughout the corporate governance world.
Continue Reading Mutant Q – The Superbug Infecting Foundational Studies on Entrenchment, Staggered Boards, and Activism

Beyond the cacophonous din of voices calling for companies to serve a “social purpose,” adopt a variety of governance proposals, achieve quarterly performance targets, and listen to (and indeed even “think like”) activists, there is now, most promisingly, a call from genuine long term shareholders for public companies to articulate and pursue a long term strategy.[1]  This latest shareholder demand directly supports the achievement of traditional corporate purposes, and seems, more than any other shareholder demand of the last decade, the most likely to increase shareholder value.  Yet in current circumstances, where all corporate defenses have been stripped in the name of “good governance,” boards and management have been given zero space in which to formulate and implement a long term strategy.  Indeed, the very fact that shareholders must demand corporations focus on long term strategy demonstrates just how effectively the governance movement has been co-opted by market forces to serve the interests of short term activists and traders to the detriment of long term investors.  It is time for long term investors to recognize that aspects of the good governance movement have in fact come at significant cost to their own investors, to be perhaps a bit more wary of partnerships with activists, and to actively create the conditions that will allow boards and management to focus on the long term.  Exhortations are not enough. The first step should be to bring back staggered boards.
Continue Reading Long-Term Investors Have a Duty to Bring Back the Staggered Board (and Proxy Advisors Should Get on Board)

In a case of first impression, GAMCO Asset Management (“GAMCO”) recently nominated a director to the board of National Fuel Gas Company (“NFG”) pursuant to NFG’s recently adopted proxy access bylaw.[1]  As far as we know, this is the first time any shareholder has nominated a director using proxy access. 
Continue Reading Proxy Access in Action: Is This What Everyone Wanted?

The Oregon Supreme Court, overturning a lower court ruling, has enforced a Delaware exclusive forum bylaw.  The case, Roberts v TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., is notable for its clear approach to the choice of law issues raised in this type of challenge and supports the increasingly common practice of public company targets adopting exclusive forum bylaws when entering into mergers agreements.
Continue Reading Oregon Supreme Court Enforces Delaware Exclusive Forum Bylaw Adopted on a Cloudy Day

In a noteworthy decision by Vice Chancellor Parsons, the Delaware Chancery Court in Longpath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron International Corporation[1] set the fair value of the target company at the agreed merger price minus estimated synergies.
Continue Reading Chancery Court Awards Merger Price less Synergies in Appraisal Proceeding