Case Law Developments

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Courts have long applied the exacting “entire fairness” standard to one-step, going-private merger transactions.  In Delaware, after years of agonizing by courts and commentators, this changed in 2013 in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp. (“MFW”).[1]  MFW held that if certain procedural protections were observed in the course of the transaction the far more deferential business judgment standard would be applied.  The required safeguards included, most notably, negotiation and approval of the transaction by a committee of the target’s independent directors and subsequent approval by an informed majority vote of target stockholders unaffiliated with the acquiror.  Last week, the New York Court of Appeals adopted Delaware’s MFW approach in its review of the Kenneth Cole Productions going-private transaction.[2] 
Continue Reading Business Judgment Rule Applied to Going-Private Mergers in New York

On May 6, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an Order that sets forth concisely the contours of the defendant-favorable standards for determining liability of directors and their advisors following the closing of sales of control of companies.  These standards are available, however, only following an uncoerced and informed approval of the sale by the target stockholders, including a majority of the disinterested holders.  Thus, while the Order clarifies a roadmap (set forth recently in Corwin v. KKR and discussed here) for obtaining easy dismissal of post-merger damages claims against directors and advisors, the need for directors and their advisors to avoid, or at least ferret out and disclose, any deficiencies in sales processes remains as strong as ever.  Only if these deficiencies are avoided or uncovered and disclosed in advance of the shareholder approval will the lower courts be able to rely on these defendant-favorable standards to dismiss claims.
Continue Reading Delaware Supreme Court Enhances Defenses Available to Directors and Financial Advisors Where Well-Run Sale Processes and Adequate Disclosure

The recently introduced “Brokaw Act” that proposes changes to the rules governing the reporting of ownership in U.S. public companies would expand the definition of “beneficial owner” to include any person with a “pecuniary or indirect pecuniary interest”, including through derivatives, in a particular security (borrowing the concept from the SEC’s insider reporting regime, which captures the “opportunity to profit” from transactions related to the relevant security). If passed and ultimately adopted, these changes would have a significant impact on the reporting obligations of investors by expanding the types of interests that would be counted toward the 5% threshold requiring the filing of a Schedule 13D. Because indentures often incorporate by direct reference the 13(d) concept of beneficial ownership, expansion of the definition could have ripple effects beyond increased public ownership filings.
Continue Reading Indentures and the Brokaw Act: Will Expanding the Definition of Beneficial Ownership Broaden Change of Control Triggers?

In two recent cases, the Delaware courts addressed the question of when a minority stockholder has sufficient influence over a corporation to be deemed a controlling stockholder.  The issue typically arises in the context of a transaction between the minority stockholder and the corporation, such as an attempt to acquire the corporation’s publicly held shares.  In such cases, the stakes for the minority stockholder can be quite high as transactions between a corporation and a controlling stockholder may be subject to the exacting  “entire fairness” standard. 
Continue Reading Controlling Minority Stockholders — When Does a Minority Constitute a Majority?

On March 28, 2016, on remand from the First Circuit, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that Sun Capital Fund III and Sun Capital Fund IV were jointly and severally liable for the multiemployer pension plan withdrawal liability of their bankrupt portfolio company, despite the fact that these funds were not parallel investment funds, generally had different investors and neither fund individually held an 80% or greater ownership interest in the portfolio company.  Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act or “ERISA”, an entity such as a corporation or a partnership engaged in a trade or business may have liability for pension liabilities of other entities in the same “controlled group”.  Although the rules are complicated and technical, entities that are under 80% or more common control with each other will generally be considered to be in the same controlled group for these purposes.  In the Sun Capital case, the District Court concluded that the funds’ coordinated efforts in forming the limited liability corporation through which they held their respective investments resulted in the funds having formed an undocumented general partnership-in-fact that was engaged in a trade or business.   As the 100% owner of the LLC formed by the funds, such de facto partnership was found to be in the portfolio company’s controlled group and its partners, the two funds, were held to be joint and severally responsible for the withdrawal liability of the portfolio company under general partnership unlimited liability principles.
Continue Reading Most Recent Sun Capital Decision Expands Reach of Controlled Group Liability Under ERISA

Directors of UK companies which are “for sale” are not (unlike directors of Delaware companies) subject to Revlon type duties to take active steps to obtain the best price reasonably available to shareholders.

However, directors of UK companies are subject to a duty to act for proper purposes, which has been interpreted by UK Courts as requiring strict board neutrality when battles for corporate control arise.  (This duty to act for proper purposes, which originated in common law principles, applies in addition to the restrictions on frustrating action applicable to listed companies under the UK Takeover Code.)  The UK proper purposes duty would for instance likely prohibit directors of UK companies from taking actions permitted under the Delaware Unocal principles, such as the establishment of a poison pill in response to an unsolicited offer which posed a threat to corporate policy.
Continue Reading Staying Neutral – UK Supreme Court Re-emphasizes Primacy of Board Neutrality When Battles for Corporate Control Arise

The Delaware Court of Chancery’s recently published opinion in Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo!, Inc.[1] (the “Opinion”) provides a reminder for  directors about the importance of process in satisfying fiduciary duties when evaluating and approving executive compensation packages.  In the Opinion, which deals with Amalgamated’s demand under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law to inspect certain books and records of Yahoo! in connection with the hiring and firing of its Chief Operating Officer, Vice Chancellor Laster discusses practices that should be routine in a board’s review of executive compensation proposals and highlights procedural pitfalls that have been noted in numerous Delaware law decisions dating back at least to the series of cases involving compensation practices at Disney beginning more than a decade ago.
Continue Reading Delaware Court of Chancery Offers Practical Lessons for Compensation Committees

Updating our recent posting concerning the enforcement of disclaimers of extra-contractual liabilities under Delaware law, in FdG Logistics LLC v. A&R Logistics Holdings, Inc. (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2016) the Delaware Court of Chancery held, in the context of a motion to dismiss, that any such disclaimer must be unambiguously expressed as a statement by the aggrieved party in order to be effective.

FdG Logistics arose out of the purchase of a trucking company by a private equity firm through a merger transaction.  The purchaser alleged that the target company “engaged in an extensive series of illegal and improper activities that were concealed from it during pre-merger due diligence” and asserted, among other things, that the selling securityholders had committed common law fraud based on alleged misrepresentations in extra-contractual materials, including a confidential information memorandum and a management presentation.
Continue Reading Another Update on Disclaimers of Extra-Contractual Liability in Delaware

The Oregon Supreme Court, overturning a lower court ruling, has enforced a Delaware exclusive forum bylaw.  The case, Roberts v TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., is notable for its clear approach to the choice of law issues raised in this type of challenge and supports the increasingly common practice of public company targets adopting exclusive forum bylaws when entering into mergers agreements.
Continue Reading Oregon Supreme Court Enforces Delaware Exclusive Forum Bylaw Adopted on a Cloudy Day

Joining a rising chorus of criticism of “disclosure settlements” in merger class actions, Chancellor Bouchard (in In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation) rejected a proposed settlement of a stockholder class action challenging Zillow, Inc.’s acquisition of Trulia, Inc. in a stock-for-stock merger that closed in February 2015.  After defendants agreed to moot plaintiffs’ disclosure claims by supplementing their disclosures before the stockholder vote, the proposed settlement would have resulted in a fee to plaintiffs’ counsel and broad releases for defendants, but no economic benefit to the stockholder class.  Although not the first to express distaste for such settlements and the incentives they create, the Chancellor’s Opinion is notable for its comprehensive discussion of their problems and firm proposals to avoid such problems going forward, including a clear message that the Court will no longer hesitate to reject disclosure settlements involving supplemental disclosures of dubious value and overbroad releases, even if unopposed.
Continue Reading Chancery Court Rejects Disclosure-Only Settlement, Suggests in Future Such Settlements Will Be Approved Only in Narrow Circumstances