I. The Transparency Register – A Recap

The 4th EU-Money-Laundering Directive (2015/849), which entered into force in mid-2015, required national legislators of EU Member States to establish, in each jurisdiction, a register for information on the beneficial owners of companies and other undertakings located in such jurisdictions (“Transparency Register”).  Echoing Justice Louis D. Brandeis’ famous metaphor of publicity as a remedy for social and industrial diseases, the Directive states that information on the beneficial ownership of companies is a key factor for tracing criminals who might otherwise hide their identity behind corporate structures.
Continue Reading A Hint of Brandeis: Proposed Amendments to the German Transparency Register

The German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) recently had the opportunity to clarify a number of important practical questions of corporate law in connection with asset disposals, the allocation of responsibilities among directors and transactions concluded with board members. We summarize the three relevant decisions from 2018/2019 below.
Continue Reading Recent Important Corporate Law Decisions by German Federal Court of Justice

Voting rights held by shareholders who are “acting in concert” are mutually attributed for purposes of the German Securities Trading Act (“WpHG”) and the German Takeover Act (“WpÜG”).  Such attribution may thus not only trigger (additional) voting rights notifications, if the relevant voting rights thresholds are reached or crossed, but also the obligation to launch a mandatory offer, if based on the voting rights so attributed a shareholder acquires control of a company.  In light of these implications, the question of what type of behavior constitutes acting in concert is of high practical relevance.  Unfortunately, the definition in statutory law is open-ended, and several details are heavily disputed.  In its decision of September 25, 2018 (II ZR 190/17), the German Federal Court of Justice (“FCJ”) had the opportunity to clarify two important questions:

First, the coordination of shareholder behavior in an individual case does not qualify as acting in concert. According to the FCJ, the question of whether coordination among shareholders is limited to an “individual case” is to be determined applying a formal rather than substantive test. Second, mutual coordination of conduct among shareholders does not constitute acting in concert if it is aimed at maintaining an existing corporate strategy (or defining it for the first time), rather than at bringing about a permanent and material change to an existing corporate strategy.
Continue Reading German Federal Court of Justice on Acting in Concert of Shareholders

German law corporate acquisition agreements and real estate purchase agreements often include broad exclusions of liability.  However, pursuant to Section 444 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), a seller is subject to statutory (non-excludable) liability if and to the extent the seller fraudulently concealed a defect of the sold asset.  To that end, it is often decisive whether the seller was required to inform the buyer about the defect in question.
Continue Reading German Federal Court of Justice on Seller Disclosure Obligations: Extensive Disclosure Required in Environmental Context

Disclosure of Ultimate Beneficial Ownership in German Companies

Key Takeaways

  • Germany recently introduced new rules on the disclosure of the ultimate beneficial owner(s) of German companies. The rules are based on the 4th EU-Money-Laundering Directive (EU) 2015/849).
  • The rules are not only relevant for German entities and German shareholders, but also for foreign groups or organizations (including private equity groups) that have or intend to acquire holdings in German entities.
  • Recent experience indicates that not all foreign players eying German M&A targets or holding significant interests in German targets are aware of these rules.
  • If your group or organization
    • has or intends to acquire a direct or indirect holding of more than 25% of the capital or the voting rights of a German entity or otherwise controls such entity, and
    • is beneficially owned or controlled by one or more natural persons,

disclosure obligations with respect to the ultimate beneficial owners may apply and should be assessed.
Continue Reading The German Transparency Register

In a recently published decision of November 7, 2017, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) has added another twist to the much debated acquisition of German Celesio AG by US pharma wholesaler McKesson.  McKesson had launched a takeover offer to the free float of Celesio in late 2013, and had entered into a purchase agreement with its then main shareholder Franz Haniel & Cie. to acquire its shareholding of slightly above 50% alongside the takeover bid.  The transaction attracted the interest of Paul Singer.  Elliott acquired a position of approximately 24% in shares and, in addition, convertible bonds of Celesio, and opposed the initial offer due to an alleged undervaluation.  As a result, the initial offer, which was subject to a minimum acceptance threshold of 75%, failed in early January 2014. The 75% acceptance threshold is key under German law, for a bidder to be in a position to exercise control over a German listed corporation and access the cash flows, prior to having effected a squeeze-out of all remaining minorities.
Continue Reading Treating Shareholders Equally – Another Chapter in the McKesson/Celesio Saga

For the past several years Cleary Gottlieb has published legal and practical information regarding German public M&A transactions.  For the new edition of the compilation Public Bids and Squeeze-Outs in Germany, a Statistical Survey (2002 – 2016), we have collected and analyzed information related to public bids and squeeze-outs in Germany from January 2002 through December 2016.
Continue Reading Public Bids and Squeeze-Outs in Germany, a Statistical Survey (2002-2016)

I. The German M&A Market – a Seller’s Market

Germany has long been an attractive market for both strategic and financial investors. This is due to a number of reasons. The German economy is traditionally shaped by highly regarded blue chips with strong brand recognition and “quality perception” as well as successful small and medium-sized companies (Mittelstand), many of them global market leaders in industrial niche markets. Germany is also considered as – and continues to prove itself to be – a stable and solid hub in a European market environment that, due to the never-ending Euro crisis, the Crimea/Ukraine crisis and other crises, has not ceased to be turbulent and volatile. More recently, the USD/EUR exchange rate has added to Germany’s attractiveness for inbound M&A transactions.
Continue Reading Current Trends in German M&A