In recent years, when pursuing corporations and their officers for violations of the U.S. securities laws, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Division of Enforcement has increasingly brought its claims to the SEC’s in-house administrative law judges (ALJs) rather than the federal civil courts.  In fact, last year, over 90% of the SEC’s actions against public companies were brought to the SEC’s ALJs—whereas five years ago, only 33% of those cases were brought as ALJ proceedings.  The credit for this remarkable increase in ALJ proceedings belongs in large part to the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act,[1] which expanded the ALJs’ jurisdiction and authorized new penalties that ALJs could impose, making it unnecessary for the SEC to bring many claims in civil courts.

Continue Reading Changes and Challenges in the SEC’s ALJ Proceedings

In a recent decision[1], Vice Chancellor Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery clarified certain issues related to the obligations of a controlling stockholder that often arise in connection with going private and similar transactions.  The case involved a relatively conventional proposal by a controlling stockholder (the Anderson family) to acquire the remaining shares of Books-A-Million, Inc. (“BAM”) from BAM’s minority stockholders.  The family structured the proposal with the goal of satisfying the conditions of the MFW decision so that any challenge to the transaction would benefit from the favorable “business judgment” level of judicial review.[2] Continue Reading Delaware Chancery Applies MFW to Dismiss Challenge to Going Private Transaction and Clarifies Obligations of Controlling Stockholders

A recent opinion from the Delaware Court of Chancery reaffirmed the importance of bringing disclosure claims before closing (when steps can still be taken to achieve an informed stockholder vote), and the difficult hurdles faced by a plaintiff pursuing disclosure claims after closing. Continue Reading Delaware Court of Chancery Reaffirms That Disclosure Claims Should Be Brought Before Closing

As the Delaware Supreme Court narrows the avenues for post-closing challenges to mergers (see our discussions of the implications of the Corwin and Cornerstone decisions here, here, here and here), we expect that plaintiffs’ lawyers will increasingly seek to base their merger suits on specific allegations of conflicts that may have tainted the oversight of processes to sell companies in hopes of supporting claims for breaches of the duty of loyalty and the applicability of the enhanced scrutiny of the entire fairness doctrine.  Given that virtually every merger includes some special merger benefits for directors that may be susceptible to an attempt at such a claim, it is timely that the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a decision over the summer of 2016 that provides useful guidance on how to evaluate the most common of special merger benefits to insiders:  protection against exposure to pre-merger claims. Continue Reading When Do Merger Benefits to Directors Constitute Disabling Conflicts?

As discussed in prior posts, recent applications of the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015) have emphasized the high bar for surviving a motion to dismiss in damages actions by stockholder plaintiffs after completion of a merger transaction, as “dismissal is typically the result” where informed, disinterested stockholder approval requires application of the business judgment rule to extinguish all claims except for waste.  See Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 152 (Del. 2016).  Two recent Chancery Court decisions have further underscored the claim-extinguishing effect of informed, disinterested stockholder approval. Continue Reading Recent Applications of <em>Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC</em> Confirm High Bar to Pleading Post-Closing Damages Actions

Since our last blog post on the changing landscape of disclosure-only settlements in the Delaware Court of Chancery, there have been developments in several areas, including the continued lower filing rates for shareholder litigation in Delaware, the adoption of the Trulia “plainly material” standard for supplemental disclosures by the Seventh Circuit, and the lower standard for disclosures required in order for plaintiffs’ lawyers to be awarded a fee in the mootness context.  Continue Reading Update About Disclosure-Only Settlements in M&A Litigation

Theresa May, the new UK Prime Minister, commented that the UK Government should adopt an industrial strategy capable of “stepping in” to defend sectors that are important to the UK economy from acquisition by overseas acquirors.  Linked is an alert memorandum prepared by our Brexit Working Group, which focuses on the existing powers available to the UK Government to prohibit acquisitions of UK companies (or indeed non-UK companies with UK operations) on “public interest” grounds within the confines of EU law and discusses how these might be expanded following Brexit. Continue Reading Industrial Strategy Post-Brexit: The UK’s Power To Block Mergers On Public Interest Grounds

Cleary Gottlieb and PwC’s Governance Insights Center have teamed up to create the Executive Compensation Series, which looks at the factors motivating boards to increasingly engage with shareholders about executive compensation. The first edition of the series is now available and discusses issues such as the impact of Dodd-Frank on executive compensation, elements of effective CD&A design and the influence of proxy advisors on compensation. Continue Reading Boards, Shareholders and Executive Pay

A settlement on July 12, 2016 by the DOJ with ValueAct for violations of the HSR Act’s notification requirements and an interpretation of the Exchange Act’s beneficial ownership reporting rules posted by the SEC staff on July 14, 2016 combine to provide new guidance that will have an immediate impact on shareholder activism and engagement. Continue Reading New Guidance on the Impact of SEC Beneficial Ownership Reporting and HSR Act Notification Regimes on Shareholder Activism and Engagement

On 12 September 2016, the rules of the UK Takeover Code governing the communication and distribution of information during a UK takeover bid will change. The rules and requirements affected are summarized in the attached memo and include the chaperoning requirement for meetings and calls with shareholders and analysts, new rules relating to the use of materials during meetings and calls, and new rules relating to the use of social media and videos during bids.  Continue Reading UK Takeover Code Update: The Communication and Distribution of Information During a UK Takeover Bid